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I. THE CLAIMS OF THE ALLIES AGAINST VENEZUELA IN
THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
It is not the purpose of this paper to pass judgment upon
the validity of the particular claims of fhe Allied Powers
against Venezuela, and still less to discuss the bearing of
the Monroe Doctrine' upon the situation; it is rather the
purpose of the writer to examine the general character of
these claims in the light of international law, and to criti-
'It cannot too often be reaffirmed, especially in view of some recent
utterances to the contrary, that the Monroe Doctrine does not, strictly
speaking, come within the scope of international law as such; it is an
American policy based upon American interests and belongs to the
domain of policy rather than of law.
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cise the method of enforcing them adopted by the allies
from this point of view. In order to make such a discussion
intelligible, it will, however, be necessary to give a brief
risumg of the facts, and especially to summarize the various
claims of Great Britain and Germany.
2
These claims may be classified as follows: I. Acts of
violence against the liberty of British subjects and the seiz-
ure of British vessels, viz: the false imprisonment and
bad treatment of British subjects and the seizure of
British fishing and trading vessels, together with the con-
fiscation of their cargoes. Several of these seizures were
made at or near the Island of Patos, a small and unin-
habited island situated some three miles off the coast of
Venezuela and about ten miles distant from Trinidad.
This island is claimed by Great Britain as a part of Trini-
dad, which she conquered in 1797, and which was formally
ceded to her by the treaty of Amiens in 18o2. Venezuela
also claims the island on the ground of cession by Spain in
1845, and denies that it formed a part of the cession of
Trinidad in 18o2. It is claimed by the partisans of Vene-
zuela that this island is used as a base for smugglers
who ship supplies into Venezuela and thus avoid the pay-
ment of the tax on goods imported into Venezuela from
Trinidad. One of these seizures was made on the high seas
and the vessel confiscated on the mere suspicion of having
furnished arms to the revolutionists. 3
On the other hand, the Venezuelan government has com-
plained of the conduct of the British colonial authorities at
Trinidad in furnishing arms and ammunition to the revolu-
tionists and- for harboring blockade runners and filibuster-
ing expeditions. It claims to have a particular grievance
in the case of "The Ban Righ," a British steamship which
was chartered by the insurgents for filibustering purposes
and allowed to leave London after a brief detention on the
assurance of the Columbian minister that she belonged to
'The claims of Great Britain and Germany are the only ones taken
into account in this paper, because they are the best known and the
most important for our purpose.
'See correspondence respecting the affairs of Venezuela presented to
Parliament in February, i9o3. No. ioS, pp. 126-29. Several of these
seizures were made in Venezuelan waters, and seem to have been justi-
fied under the circumstances.
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Columbia. "The Ban Righ" sailed to Venezuela, where she
seems to have been of material assistance to the revolu-
tionists.
4
2. Losses of British and German subjects in the course
of recent civil wuars and revolutions. These are, as it would
appear, mainly in the nature of forced loans, and of con-
tributions and requisitions for military purposes. It is
claimed that plantations and buildings have been pillaged
and destroyed and that movables, more particularly cattle,
have been appropriated by insurgents and government
forces alike.5
3. The claims of British and German creditors. These
include the ordinary bondholders and a number of German
and English investors, some of whose investments, at least,
have been guaranteed by the Venezuelan government.6
In examining these claims, it should be noted, in the
first place, that the nature of the claims of Great Britain
and Germany is by no means identical in all respects. Ger-
many, as it appears, does not complain of acts of violence
against her seamen or the seizure of her vessels and the
confiscation of their cargoes. The British have, on the
' See correspondence, or Par. "Blue Book," cited above, passim.
'See memorandum by the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of
Germany's claims against Venezuela, published in the London Times,
weekly edition, for December 12, i9o2, and an interview with Chancellor
von Buelow by a representative of the Associated Press in the New
York Times for December 21, 1902.
' The chief loan is said to be one of 5ooooooo bolivares or about
$9,ooo,ooo bearing interest at 5 per cent, negotiated by the Berliner
Disconto Gesellschaft in 1896, with the Venezuelan customs pledged as
security. The interest on these bonds, held mainly by Germans, is four
years in arrears. The most important of the investments guaranteed
by the Venezuelan government are said to be those of the stockholders
in the great Venezuelan Railroad Company, a railroad 200 miles in
length, built by German contractors with German capital at a cost (?)
of $2ooooooo. The Venezuelan government guaranteed an interest
of 7 per cent on this capital stock, and it is claimed that the govern-
ment has not only failed to meet this obligation, but that it owes
several million dollars for the transport of troops, munitions of war,
etc. The British also presented claims on behalf of several English
railroad companies in Venezuela for services rendered to the govern-
ment and damage done to their property by government troops as well
as for failure to meet deferred liabilities.
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other hand, made these seizures and acts of violence and
confiscation the chief burden of their complaints. Lords
Balfour and Cranborne have repeatedly assured the British
Parliament that the British government was influenced less
by claims of British bondholders than by attacks on the
liberty of British subjects. "Our first-line claims," says
the London Times,7 "are for outrages on the liberty and
property of our fellow-subjects, and, including the shipping-
claims, would be covered by a few thousand pounds. We
have been ready all along to refer our other claims to a
mixed commission."
It should also be noted that very little stress seems to be
laid in England upon the second class of claims, viz: losses
sustained by British and German subjects in Venezuela
during recent civil wars and revolutions. It is upon these
claims, however, that Germany insists most strongly. In
an interview with a representative of the Associated Press,
Chancellor von Buelow is reported to have said: "Among
German claims in Venezuela, we give precedence to those
arising from the last Venezuelan civil wars. These are not
mere business debts, contracted by Venezuela, but they have
grown out of acts of violence against German citizens in
Venezuela, either by forced loans or by seizure of cattle
without payment, or by the pillage of German houses and
estates."8
Let us now see what principles of international law should
govern the settlement of these various sorts or categories
of claims.
In respect to the first class of claims, viz: Acts of violence
against the liberty of British subjects and the seizure of
British vessels, it should be observed that the question of
their legality and justice seems, in large part, to hinge upon
the question of title to the small and barren island of Patos.
If this island belongs to Great Britain, the Venezuelan
government has, in authorizing or sanctioning several
of these seizures, clearly been guilty of a series of viola-
tions of British territorial sovereignty in British waters
for which full and ample apology and reparation should
" London Times, weekly edition, for December 26, 19o2.
' See New York Times for December 21, 1902.
LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
at once have been made. If, however, it belongs to Vene-
zuela, some of the seizures, at least, may have been justi-
fied. In view of the geographical situation of the island,
the fact that Great Britain has but recently taken formal
possession of it, and the doubtful character of the British
title at its best, there should be no reluctance on the part
of Great Britain to submit the question of title or sover-
eignty to arbitration. An unwillingness to arbitrate this
question would seem to indicate a fullness of confidence
in the legality of her title, which the facts do not appear to
justify, or a disposition to evade the Monroe Doctrine.
The seizure and confiscation of a British vessel on the
high seas could only be justified on the theory that she had
been engaged in rendering active assistance to the insur-
gents, or that she had violated an effective blockade. The
so-called blockade, which President Castro claims to have
established at the mouth of the Orinoco in the summer of
1902, seems, however, to have been wholly ineffective and
was not recognized by either Germany or Great Britain.
But if Great Britain appears to have just and undoubted
claims against Venezuela in a few cases, Venezuela would
seem to be entitled to counter-damages for any injuries
which she may have suffered in consequence of the escape
of "The Ban Righ," i. e., provided the British government
can be convicted of any lack of "due diligence" in the
matter.sa The British government would also be liable in
damages for the use of Trinidad as a base of military
operations, i. e., the headquarters for the regular and con-
stant supply of arms and ammunition to the insurgents; or
for the fitting out of military or filibustering expeditions,
provided these facts can be conclusively proven. It is now
generally recognized that "international law imposes upon
third powers, in case of an insurrectionary movement or of
civil war, certain obligations towards established or recog-
nized governments which are engaged in a struggle with
an insurrection," and "it is especially interdicted to every
third power to permit the organization within its domains of
military expeditions hostile to established or recognized gov
sa This is not probable. The explanations offered by the British gov-
ernment seem to be entirely satisfactory.
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ernments."' 9 On the other hand, the mere furnishing of
arms and ammunition to the insurgents in the ordinary way
of trade merely justify their seizure as contraband of war,
and would not involve any responsibility on the part of the
British government.
In respect to the second class of claims, viz: the losses of
British and German subjects during recent civil wars and
revolutions, it is impossible to pronounce until all the facts
regarding each particular claim are definitely known and
ascertained. These claims are often grossly exaggerated 0
and they should, in all cases, be passed upon by a mixed
commission or by a court of arbitration. The general
'See Art. I and Art. IL 3, of the rules adopted by the Institut de
Droit International in Annuaire for igoo.
" The following examples selected from Moore's Work on Arbitration
may serve to illustrate the gross attempts at fraud and exaggeration
which usually, if not always, accompany these claims:
The Civil War claims of Great Britain against the United States,
which were settled by a mixed commission in 1873, amounted (with
interest) to about $g6,oooooo. Less than $2,oooooo was actually
awarded to the British claimants. Of the 478 British claims 259 were
for property alleged to have been taken by the military, naval or civil
authorities of the United States; I8I for property alleged to have been
destroyed by the military and naval forces of the United States; 7 for
property destroyed by the Confederacy; ioo for damages for the alleged
unlawful arrest and imprisonment of British subjects by the authori-
ties of the United States; 77 for damages for the alleged unlawful
capture and condemnation or detention of British vessels and their
cargoes as prize of war by the naval forces and civil authorities of the
United States. See Moore on Arbitration, I, pp. 692-93.
The claims of France growing out of the Civil War were also settled
by a mixed commission which met in 188o-84. They aggregated about
$35,ooo,ooo. The amount actually awarded was $625,566.35, i. e., less
than 2 per cent of the amount claimed. Many of the claims are said
to have been fraudulent and others were greatly exaggerated. Most
of the awards are said to have been for injuries inflicted by the armies
of the United States, i. e., presumably for violations of the laws of
warfare. See Moore, II, pp. 1133 if, I156 if.
The claims of the citizens of the United States against Mexico, which
were presented to the mixed commission which met in July, 1869, and
continued in session until January, 1876, amounted to the enormous
sum of $47oooo,ooo. The actual amount awarded was $4,oooooo or
less than i per cent. The claims of citizens of Mexico against the
United States amounted to $86,oooooo. They received $i5qooo. See
Moore, II, pp. 1319 ff.
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principles of international law which should govern all such
awards are, however, sufficiently clear and well-established,
and may be stated in a few words.
The general rule is that "a sovereign is not ordinarily
responsible to alien residents for injuries they receive on his
territory from belligerent action, or from insurgents whom
he could not control." It is also "a received principle of
public law that the subjects of foreign powers domiciled in
a country in a state of war (or insurrection) are not en-
titled to greater privileges or immunities than the other in-
habitants of the insurrectionary district. If, for a supposed
purpose of the war, one of the belligerents thinks proper to
destroy neutral property, the other cannot legally be re-
garded as accountable therefor. By voluntarily remain-
ing in a country in a state of civil war they must be held to
have been willing to accept the risks as well as the advant-
ages of that domicile."'-
These principles have repeatedly been enunciated by our
leading statesmen as well as by those of Europe,12 and they
have the sanction of nearly all the leading authorities on
international law, like Calvo, Pradier-Fod6r6, Funck-
Brentano et Sorel, Bluntschli, Rivier, Hall. etc. They have
invariably been applied by European states in their relations
with each other, although they havte sometimes been vio-
lated in their dealings with weaker states, more particularly
with China and the republics of South and Central America.
There are, however, a number of exceptions which must
be made to these general principles. Indemnity is due by
way of exception in the following cases: (I) Where the act
from which the foreigners have suffered was directed against
foreigners in general as such, or against these as the sub-
jects of some particular state. (2) Where the injury has re-
sulted from an act contrary to the laws or treaties of the
state in which the act was committed, and for which no
'See Wharton's Digest, II, pp. 576-78.
" See especially the notes of Prince Schwartzenberg and Count Nes-
selrode, in behalf of the Austrian and Russian governments respectively,
in reply to certain claims of the British government which were based
upon injuries to British subjects during the revolutions in Tuscany
and Naples in 1848. Cited by Pradier-Fod6r6, I, § 205, pp. 343-45.
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redress can otherwise be obtained. (3) When there has
been a violation of the principles of international law, more
particularly of the laws of legitimate warfare. (4) In cases
where there has been an evident denial or a palpable viola-
tion of justice, or where there has been an undue discrimina-
tion against foreigners in the administration thereof.13
In the application of these principles to the claims under
consideration, constant reference must be made to the laws
of modern warfare, more especially to the fundamental law
of reasonable military necessity, viz: that only so much
violence is permissible in war as is sufficient to destroy the
enemy's power of resistance. Pillage is strictly forbidden
and private property on land is not subject to capture ex-
cept in the regular way of fines, requisitions, and contribu-
tions. The invader has an undoubted right to levy or col-
lect these at his own discretion, and he may, if he chooses,
make war support itself. But they should be as orderly and
as light as possible, and they should not exceed the needs of
the troops or the resources of the district in which they are
levied. Still it must always be borne in mind that the law
of reasonable military necessity is the highest law of the
land in time of war, and that foreigners do not occupy a
privileged position and are, by no means, exempt from the
operation of this law. On the other hand, they are exempt
from military service and the exaction of forced loans for
the support of military operations, although they may be
called upon to support the war in the ordinary way of taxa-
tion.
In respect to the third class of claims, viz: those of British
and German bondholders and British and German creditors
whose investments have been guaranteed by the Venezuelan
government, a very few words must suffice here. The few
authorities, comparatively speaking, who discuss this ques-
tion are almost equally divided in their opinions. The right
of a state to use coercive measures in the collection of debts
due its subjects by another state in asserted, e. g., by Hall,
Phillimore, and Rivier; but it is denied by Calvo, Pradier-
"See the rules adopted by the Institut de Droit International in
Annuaire for i9oo; Pradier-Fodri, §§ 2o4 and 1336; and Wharton's
Digest, II, §§ 225 and 230.
LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Fod~r6, de Martens, and Rolin-Jaequemyns. It is argued,
on the one hand, that the public faith, the so-called "honor
of the prince," is peculiarly engaged in behalf of contracts
of this nature; that the foreigner may have no other means
of redress than that of appealing to the government of the
state to which he owes allegiance, and which is supposed to
have an interest in the fortunes and prosperity of its citizens
abroad; and that stock in the public debt held even by an
enemy is exempt from seizure and its interest payable even in
time of war. On the other hand, it is urged that hazardous
loans and investments should be discouraged as much as
possible; that those making them do so as a rule with a full
knowledge of the risks involved and in the hope of ex-
ceptionally large returns; that the natural penalty of a
failure on the part of a state to pay its debts is a loss of
credit; that coercive measures for the collection of bad debts
have never been employed except against a weaker state; and
that in any case foreigners cannot expect to be preferred to
native creditors.
The leading statesmen of England and America also
occupy opposite sides in this controversy. The English
view, as stated by Lord Palmerston in 1848 in a circular
addressed to representatives of Great Britain in foreign
countries, insists that the question as to whether such claims
are to be made a subject of diplomatic negotiation is "for
the British government entirely a matter of discretion, and
by no means a question of international right.' 14  With a
view, however, of discouraging the investment of British
capital in hazardous loans to foreign governments and of
encouraging investment in profitable undertakings at home,
"the British government has hitherto thought it the best
policy to abstain from taking up as international questions
the complaints made by British subjects against foreign
governments which have failed to make good their engage-
ments in regard to such pecuniary transactions." But he
intimates that such losses might become so great as to make
a change of policy in this respect advisable. This view was
reaffirmed by Lord Salisbury in i88o.
Mr. Blaine, acting in his capacity as Secretary of State
"Cited, e. g., by Phillimore, II, Chap. 3.
257
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in 1881, laid it down "as a rule of universal acceptance and
practice" that a "person voluntarily entering into a con-
tract with the government of a foreign country or with the
subjects or citizens of such foreign power, for any griev-
ances he may have or losses he may suffer resulting from
such contract, is remitted to the laws of the country with
whose government or citizens the contract is entered into
for redress."' 5 The government of the United States has
not only always refused to use any other means than its
good offices for the collection of such claims, but it has not
concealed the fact that it "cannot but regard with great
anxiety the attempt of a foreign government to compel by
force the payment of mere contract debts due subjects of
such governments by a South American state."'8
II. THE: CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES IN THE LIGHT OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW.
In the preceding part of this discussion, an attempt was
made to classify and discuss the claims of England and Ger-
many against Venezuela in the light of certain well-estab-
lished principles of international law. It is the purpose of
the writer now to discuss the methods employed by the
allies in enforcing their claims and to criticise their conduct
in particular instances.
The general principles laid down were that "ordinarily, or
as a general rule, no indemnity is due to foreigners for
injuries which they may receive on his territory from bel-
ligerent action, or from insurgents whom he could not con-
trol," and that "the subjects of foreign powers domiciled in a
country in a state of war (or insurrection) are not entitled
to greater privileges or immunities than the other inhabi-
tants of the insurrectionary district." Certain exceptions
to these rules were, however, admitted' 7 under which
head some of the claims of the allies undoubtedly fall.1s
Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, to Mr. Logan, I881, in Wharton's
Digest, IL § 231.
'Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, to Mr. Lowell, 1883, in
Wharton's Digest, IL § 232.
See above, p. 255.
"Up to the present time no state has admitted, unless by way of
exception, any obligation to indemnify even its own subjects for
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In attempting to secure redress or justice, foreigners
should in the first instance have recourse to the local or
territorial tribunals of the district in which they are domi-
ciled, or, as Vattel' 9 puts it, to the "judge of the place." Lo-
cal remedies should first be exhausted before resorting to dip-
lomatic means of obtaining redress; but this rule "does not
apply where there is no local judiciary, or where the judi-
cial action is in violation of international law, or where
the test is waived, or where there is undue discrimination."
"It does not apply to countries of imperfect civilization, or
to cases in which prior proceedings show great perversion
of justice"; "but such denial of justice must be definitely
shown." 20
injuries or losses sustained during a period of war or insurrection.
Such claims were ruled out by the United States government in respect
to losses inflicted upon British subjects by the Confederate authorities
during the Civil War (see Moore on Arbitration, I, p. 684), although
a mixed commission was instituted after its close for the consideration
of claims arising out of captures by United States cruisers, arbi-
trary arrests, compulsory military service, and other alleged violations
of the personal rights of British subjects. A similar convention was
also concluded with France. A commission or Court of Claims was also
established at Washington in i868 to examine the claims of American
citizens and foreigners based upon losses or acts of spoliation suffered
during the Civil War in consequence of the conduct of the Federal
authorities. Indemnities for similar claims have been granted by Euro-
pean states, notably by France, but it is universally admitted that there
is no obligation in this matter.
"Book II, Chap. 8, § iO3. Cf. Book II, Chap. 6, §§ 72 and 73.
' Wharton's Digest, II, §§ 24i and 242, espec. p. 695. Calvo, the
great South American publicist, seems to be the only great authority
on international law who refuses to admit these exceptions. He denies
categorically that a government is responsible by way of indemnity
for any losses or injuries sustained by foreigners in time of civil war
or internal troubles. "To admit the principle of indemnity," he says,
"would be to create an exorbitant and fatal privilege essentially favor-
able to powerful states and injurious to weaker nations, to establish an
unjustifiable inequality between natives and foreigners." It would be
an attack on one of the essential elements of the independence of
nations, viz: that of territorial jurisdiction. "This," he says, "is the
real significance of 'this frequent recourse to the diplomatic method of
settling disputes which by their nature and surrounding circumstances
belong to the exclusive domain of the ordinary courts." Calvo, III,
§ 1280, p. 142. Cf. § 1297 and Vol. VI, § 256. The doctrine of Calvo
does not, however, seem to have found any support outside of Latin
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Let us now consider the methods adopted by the Allied
Powers in enforcing their claims. It appears from the "Cor-
respondence respecting the Affairs of Venezuela," pre-
sented to the British Parliament in February, 19o2, that it
was mainly a series of attacks on the liberty and property
of British subjects culminating in the seizure of the "Queen"
on the high seas and the confiscation of that vessel by the
Venezuelan government 2 ' which finally led the British gov-
ernment to address a formal protest to that of Venezuela
on July 30, 19o2. The Venezuelan government was in-
formed that unless it "promptly pay to the injured parties
full compensation wherever satisfactory evidence has been
furnished to His Majesty's government that such is justly
due, His Majesty's government will take such steps as may
be necessary to obtain the reparation which they are en-
titled to demand from the Venezuelan government in these
cases," etc.22  In reply to these demands, the Venezuelan
government stated that some of the cases mentioned had
already been settled, that others were on the road to settle-
ment (i. e., to be decided ex parte by the Venezuelan govern-
ment), but that the Venezuelan government had decided
to postpone its reply to all such representations in conse-
quence of the partiality towards the revolutionists displayed
by the government of Trinidad, and pending a settlement
America. Its acceptance might leave foreigners in certain localities
without any protection whatever against injustice or oppression. On
the other hand, it must be admitted that diplomacy seems to give an
undue advantage to stronger against weaker states. Differences of this
nature should always be settled by mixed commissions or courts of
arbitration. In order to make the necessary arrangements for these,
resort to diplomacy or negotiation is, however, absolutely necessary.
The principle of irresponsibility has been incorporated in a number
of treaties between South American and European states with each
other. It was incorporated in tle resolutions of the Pan-American
Congress which met at Washington in 1889 and in the Constitution of
Venezuela adopted in 1893. See report presented by M. Brusa to the
Institut de Droit International for 1898 in Aniuaire, p. 2I1; article by
M. de Bar in Revue de Droit International for I899, t. 29, P. 469, and
Pradier-Fod&r6, I, § 205, p. 347.
' See "Blue Book" on Venezuela, No. io8, pp. I26-i29, for a list
of these seizures.
" Ibid., No. rIO, p. 129, and No. 122, p. 138.
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relative to the "Ban Righ" question.23 This position was
maintained by Venezuela in spite of another communication
from Great Britain. This attitude on the part of Venezuela
finally led to the ultimatum of December 7, 1902. In this
ultimatum the British government demanded of the Vene-
zuelan government that it recognize in principle the justice
of all well-founded claims. These are to include those of the
bondholders and the civil war claims, as well as the shipping
claims and those which had arisen in consequence of the
maltreatment or false imprisonment of British subjects. In
these last-named cases immediate payment was demanded;
but in respect to other classes of claims, the British govern-
ment announced that it was willing to accept the decisions
of a mixed commission as to the amount and security for
payment.
2 4
The memorandum prepared by the Imperial Chancellor
on the subject of Germany's claims against Venezuela,
25
states that "as the result of numerous applications the Vene-
zuelan government issued a decree on January 24, 19O1, by
which a commission consisting solely of Venezuelan officials
was to decide upon all claims." That decree, he says, was
unsatisfactory because (I) all claims originating before
the presidency of Senor Castro were ignored; (2) any diplo-
matic protest was precluded; (3) payments were to be made
with bonds of a new revolutionary loan, which, in the light
of previous experiences, would evidently be almost worth-
less. All attempts to get the decree altered failed, and the
Imperial government refused to recognize it. Similar dec-
larations were made by the governments of Great Britain,
the United States, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. "But
as Venezuela insisted that foreigners could not be treated
differently from Venezuelan subjects, and that the claims
must be considered as comin; within the scope of internal
ibid., No. 123, pp. 139-140.
"For the text of the ultimatum and a very amusing reply, see the
Par. "Blue Book," cited above, No. 217, pp. 187-189.
'See London Times (weekly edition) for December 12, 1902. CE
Communication, dated December 7, 19o2, of Von Pilgrim-Baltazzi,
German Charge d'Affaires to German Minister of Foreign Affairs in
New York Times for December 14, 19o2.
THE VENEZUELAN AFFAIR IN THE
affairs, the Imperial government examined the German
claims itself, and, so far as they appeared well-founded,
made the Venezuelan government responsible for them."
Venezuela finally declined all further discussion, claiming
that the settlement of foreign war claims by diplomatic
means was out of the question. "That," the chancellor ex-
claims, "is not in accordance with international law."
As a result of this attitude on the part of the Venezuelan
government, "and as in the last civil war Germans had been
treated by the Venezuelan government troops with especial
violence," the Imperial Charge d'Affaires at Caracas handed
to the Venezuelan government on December 7, 19o2, an
ultimatum demanding the immediate payment of some
1,70o,ooo bolivares or $340,000, the amount of the civil war
claims of Germany up to the year 190. To these were
added the claims of German firms for the building of a
slaughter-house at Caracas and those of the German Great
Venezuelan Railroad Company, as well as a demand for the
fixing and guaranteeing of the amount of the claims arising
out of the recent civil war.
It will thus be seen that Venezuela, acting in accordance
with the Calvo doctrine which she appears to have incor-
porated in her own constitution and laws, 20 insisted upon
an ex parte settlement of the claims of the allies by her own
authorities. She refused even to discuss the complaints of
Great Britain until her own grievances relative to the "Ban
Righ" question and the conduct of the British colonial
authorities at Trinidad had been settled. In the absence
of complete and definite knowledge respecting the char-
acter and degree of guilt of the British government and its
agents in .these matters, it is impossible to say whether the
See the Constitution of 1893. Article II of the new law bearing on
the rights of foreigners submitted to the Venezuelan Congress by
President Castro in March, I9O2, declares that "foreigners shall have
no right to resort to the diplomatic channel, except when having ex-
hausted all legal means before the competent authorities, it clearly
appears that there is a denial of justice or notorious injustice." This
law seems to make concessions which Calvo himself was not prepared
to make. For the text of this law, see Current History for June, 1o2,
Vol. XlI, p. 36.
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Venezuelan government was justified in refusing reparation
for its attacks on the liberty and property of British subjects;
but it would seem that such a high-handed act as the seizure
of a British vessel on the high seas demanded at least some
explanation, if not a full and prompt apology and repara-
tion. Her method of dealing with the German claims, how-
ever ill-founded these may have been, was also extremely
objectionable from the point of view of international law
and diplomacy.
Under these circumstances (assuming the facts to be as
stated in the official reports), the allies seem to have been
legally justified in resorting to coercive measures for the
purpose of securing at least the proper consideration of their
claims. The method adopted was that of reprisals. They
agreed in the first place to seize the gunboats of the Vene-
zuelan navy, and then to establish a "pacific" blockade of
certain Venezuelan ports.
This method was open to no serious objection. Reprisals
have long been a recognized mode of obtaining repara-
tion in cases of an evident denial or an unreasonable delay
of justice2 7 after all other means of obtaining redress have
been exhausted. They consist in the forcible seizure and
sequestration of goods belonging to the .offending state or
its subjects, and holding them until a satisfactory reparation
is made for the alleged injury. The alternative is war,
from which reprisals differ only in degree and extent of
violence used and in the consequences of such acts of vio-
lence upon both belligerent and third powers.28  Reprisals
may be exercised in many ways, and they vary in the ex-
tent and degree of violence employed, from the seizure of a
few merchant or war vessels belonging to the offending
state or the "pacific" blockade of a few ports to the tem-
porary occupation of a portion of its territory. It is par-
ticularly to be noted that "these measures imply a temporary
sequestration, as opposed to confiscation or destruction of
' For the classic passage on reprisals, see Vattel, Book II, Chap. 18,
P. 342.
' So, for example, there is no obligation of neutrality on the part of
third powers, and a treaty of peace is unnecessary on the part of the
belligerents.
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the property taken, ' 29 and that property thus taken should
be restored after reparation has been made. "The objection
sometimes made to reprisals, that they are applicable only
to the weaker Powers, since a strong Power would at once
treat them as acts of war, is indeed the strongest recom-
mendation of this mode of obtaining redress. To localize
hostile pressure as far as possible, and to give it such a char-
acter as shall restrict its incidence to the peccant state, is
surely in the interest of the general good." 30
A favorite form of reprisal has in recent times been that
of pacific blockade. It consists in the so-called "pacific" or
"peaceful" blockade of a portion or the whole of the coast
of the offending state. Authorities on international law
are divided3 1 in their opinions as to the legality, justice and
real character of pacific blockades; but there have been
at least a dozen instances32 of its application since the date
of its first appearance in 1827, and they form a part at least
of the practice, if not of the theory, of international law.
It should, however, be observed that neutrals or third states
need not recognize them as binding upon themselves, in
which case it must be admitted that they may remain largely
ineffective.
33
"T. E. Holland in a letter to the London Times (see weekly edition)
for December 26, i9o2.
See Holland, cited above.
'As more or less in favor of pacific blockade, we may cite Fiore,
Rolin-Jacquemyns, Pradier-Fodr6, Heffter, Calvo, Couchy, Perels,
Bulmerincq and Lawrence; as opposed Hautefeuille, Pistoye, et Du-
verdy, Fauchille, Geffcken, Bluntschli, De Martens, Hall and Woolsey.
On the one side it is urged that pacific blockades are humant, that they
limit or localize the area and violence of the struggle, that they do not
necessarily lead to war, and that, whether we like them or not, they
have been introduced into the practice of the law of nations. On the
other hand, it is urged that they are based upon the dictates of interest
rather than upon those of humanity, that they hre only resorted to by
stronger against weaker nations, that they are apt to lead to war, and
that they impose onerous duties upon third powers or, if not enforced
against these, are illusory and ineffective.
'For a list, see Calvo, III, liv. i9, § 6, pp. 534 ff.
'The pacific blockade of the coast of Greece in 1886 was a model
in this respect. Only the Greek flag was excluded. The pacific block-
ade of Crete in 8.97 unfortunately marked a return to the older and
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As has been said, no sound objection can possibly be
made either against the method of reprisals in general or
against the specific forms of reprisal adopted by the allies,
viz: the seizure and sequestration of the Venezuelan gun-
boats and the "pacific" blockade of certain portions of the
Venezuelan coast. But no sooner had the small and insignifi-
cant Venezuelan navy been seized than its German captors
were guilty of an act which amounted to an act of war and
which was a distinct violation of the law of reprisal, viz:
the sinking of several Venezuelan gunboats.34  This act of
warfare was soon followed by the bombardment of Puerto
Cabello under circumstances which could hardly be justified
even during war.
35
It is therefore scarcely a matter for surprise that Premier
Balfour should'have admitted to Parliament on December
wholly indefensible practice of interfering with the commerce of third
states. See Lawrence, Principles of International Law, App. IV.
The view taken above is in accordance with the position of the
United States and, we believe, is in agreement with the usual practice of
Great Britain as well, although Germany apparently assumes a different
attitude towards third powers. The instructions to naval officers,
issued by the British Admiralty (see Par. "Blue Book," No. 183, pp.
170-17), on December ii, i9o2, show, however, that Great Britain
intended to follow the German view in this instance. The blockade is
to be enforced against third powers as well as against Venezuela. The
United States showed her attitude by refusing to recognize it. Our
view has the saction of the Institut de Droit International, which, after
having declared against pacific blockades in 1874, declared itself in
1887 in favor of permitting them under the following conditions: (i)
that "vessels with a foreign flag may be permitted to enter freely in
spite of the blockade; (2) the pacific blockade must be officially de-
clared and notified, and maintained by a sufficient force; (3) the
vessels of the blockaded power which does not respect such a blockade
may be sequestered. The blockade being ended, they should be restored
together with their cargoes to their owners without having been injured
in any respect." See Annuatre de l'Institut de Droit International,
1887-88, pp. 300-301.
"In German official circles this act was explained on the following
contradictory grounds: (i) that the vessels were old and unseaworthy;
(2) that it was necessary in order to prevent them from falling into
the hands of the enemy.
,' This bombardment was due to an insult to the British flag by a
mob. The Venezuelan government seems to have been given insuffi-
cient time for the requisite apology or reparation.
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17 that these were not methods of peaceful coercion, but
acts of war. 86 There followed the official declaration of
a war blockade on December 2o. The seizure of the Vene-
zuelan navy and the pacific blockade of the Venezuelan ports,
intended as mere acts of reprisal, had, owing to the hasty
and ill-considered acts of the allies, more especially of Ger-
many, ripened into actual war, and this, after overtures for
peace had been made and Venezuela had practically sur-
rendered to the Allied Powers.
Another incident of the war which has attracted much
adverse criticism was the shelling of the fort of San Carlos
by the "Panther" and several other German warships on
January 21 and 22, 1903, in which a number of non-com-
batants as well as soldiers were killed and wounded. This
bombardment was made while negotiations were pending
and it was variously explained by German officials and com-
.manders as due to a desire on their part to make the block-
ade more effective by seeking to prevent the importation of
contraband, more particularly of coffee, into Venezuela via
Colombia, and to chastise the insolence of the Venezuelans
and their exaltation over the affair of January I7, when
the "Panther" was successfully turned back after a vain
attempt to enter Lake Maracaibo.a
7
We have here a bundle of contradictions as to the
facts, but the vital facts in the controversy, viz: that it was
the movements of the "Panther" which provoked the fort
of San Carlos to action, and that the bombardment was
instituted during a critical period in the conduct of negotia-
tions, are well established. These movements the "Pan-
ther" had a distinct legal right to make, from whatever
motive, under the laws of warfare; but they constituted an
advance into the enemy's country during a period in which
' It is, however, to be regretted that the Prime Minister allowed him-
self to be drawn into a declaration against the validity of pacific
blockades.
" There are also conflicting statements as to the original motive of
the "Panther" in entering the lake. By some she is said to have
entered for the purpose of seeking refuge from a storm; by others
in order to attack a Venezuelan gunboat. The true reason is probably
that given by German officials, viz: that she was engaged in an attempt
to make the blockade more effective.
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hostilities should have been suspended, i. e., pending the
conduct of negotiations, although no truce had formally
been declared.
Another interesting and, as it seems, an altogether
novel feature in this controversy is the claim to preferential
treatment made by the allies over against the states, notably
France, which had effected settlements with Venezuela with-
out resorting to coercion. Such preferential treatment,
while perhaps not directly contrary to international law,
would undoubtedly, as Minister Bowen is reported to have
intimated to the allies, be offensive to modern civilization
and contrary to modern conceptions of international mo-
rality. It would be an incentive to forcible and warlike
methods of coercion in the collection of debts, rather than
to a peaceful settlement of claims of this character.38 We
await the decision of the Hague Tribunal on this point with
the utmost confidence in its wisdom and impartial judgment.
Amos S. Hershey.
It has, however, been urged on the other side that "these creditors
of Venezuela, who, having taken no part in the heat and burden of
the day, desire to share equally with those who have spent treasure
and perhaps blood, in reducing President Castro to order" should
not participate in the division of the fruits of conquest. London Times
(weekly edition) for February 6, 19o3.
The case seems to be somewhat analogous to proceedings in invol-
untary bankruptcy. In such a case the creditors who have instituted
legal proceedings are not preferred to those who enter their claims
afterwards. All stand upon an equal footing before the law.
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